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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (1935) is reexam-
ined in the light of Shannon’s information theory (1948). The
EPR argument did not take into account that the observers’
information was localized, like any other physical object.
I had the privilege of meeting Jim Cushing in 1986,
during a conference that Daniel Greenberger had orga-
nized in the World Trade Center in New York City [1].
Some time later Cushing sent me a copy of his book [2],
where our encounter is related in a footnote:
“I mentioned to Peres that his position ap-
peared to be an instrumentalist one. He
replied with no apparent discomfort that oth-
ers had told him that before. For a physicist’s
statement on an instrumentalist interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, see Peres (1988)
[3].”
Jim had asked me that question with the same tone as
if he were asking whether I was a cannibal. For a more
recent discussion on this subject, see [4].
On the other hand, I never had the privilege of meeting
Albert Einstein. He died when I was an undergraduate.
I had always been fascinated by Einstein, as any normal
Jewish boy would be, and later in my life I even got the
impression that I came to know him personally. This is
because my PhD thesis advisor was Nathan Rosen, who
had been a close collaborator of Einstein. Together they
built the Einstein-Rosen bridge in General Relativity [5],
and together with Podolsky they formulated the famous
EPR paradox [6]. Rosen told me many anecdotes about
Einstein and his reactions to various events. (Rosen’s
wife Hanna, who was an accomplished pianist, gave piano
accompaniment to Einstein who played the violin.)
My first encounter with the EPR paper occurred when
I was a graduate student, circa 1958. The subject of my
research was gravitational radiation. At that time, I was
rather ignorant of quantum theory, having graduated in
mechanical and nuclear engineering, not in physics. One
day, I came into Rosen’s office, and I found him sort-
ing out his papers. On the ground, there were cartons
full of old reprints, with the characteristic green cov-
ers of The Physical Review. One of them read: “Can
Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete?” The authors were A. Einstein,
B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen. I thought that this would
be a nice item to have in my collection of reprints, and
politely asked:
“Professor Rosen, may I take one of these reprints?”
He looked concerned.
“Ha, how many are left?”
We counted them, which was not difficult: there were
two. Then he said, with some hesitation,
“Well, if there are two, you may have one.”
This is how I acquired the last available reprint of the
famous article of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
Let us have a look at that wonderful paper. You
will immediately notice that Eqs. (7) and (8) involve
entangled wave-functions, and indeed the whole issue is
about the physical consequences of such an entanglement.
Entangled wave-functions were not new at that time:
you can find one, for example, in Eq. (10) of Rosen’s
1931 seminal paper on the ground state of the hydro-
gen molecule [7], which is probably more famous among
chemists than the EPR paper is among physicists.
Some time after that work, Rosen became a post-doc of
Einstein at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Prince-
ton. One day, at the traditional 3 o’clock tea, Rosen men-
tioned to Einstein a fundamental issue of interpretation
related to entangled wave-functions. Einstein immedi-
ately saw the implications for his long standing disagree-
ment with Bohr. As they discussed the problem, Boris
Podolsky joined the conversation, and later proposed to
write an article. Einstein acquiesced. When he later saw
the text, he disliked the formal approach, but agreed to
its publication. Then, as soon as the EPR article ap-
peared, Podolsky relased its contents to the New York
Times (4 May 1935, page 11) in a way implying that the
authors had found that quantum mechanics was faulty.
This infuriated Einstein, who after that no longer spoke
with Podolsky.
The EPR “paradox” drew immediate attention. Niels
Bohr [8] found the reasoning faulty, because it contra-
dicted his complementarity principle. Bell, in his first
article on hidden variables and contextuality [9], wrote
“the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is resolved in the
way which Einstein would have liked least.” Actually, the
example given by Bell in the proof of his celebrated the-
orem [10] is based on a much simpler entangled system:
two spin- 1
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particles in a singlet state [11]. In 1991, David
Mermin came to Technion to give the annual Wunsch
Lecture. He said that the EPR paper was wrong. After
the talk, there was as usual a discussion period. Nathan
Rosen politely commented: the paper is not wrong, it
makes some assumptions, and then draws the logical con-
1
clusions; the assumptions were wrong.
The EPR article was not wrong, but it had been writ-
ten too early. Only some years later, in 1948, Claude
Shannon published his theory of information [12] (and it
took many more years before the latter was included in
the physicist’s toolbox). Shannon was employed by the
Bell Telephone Company and his problem was to make
communication more efficient. Shannon showed that in-
formation could be given a quantitative measure, that
he called entropy. It was later proved that Shannon’s
entropy is fully equivalent to ordinary thermodynamical
entropy [13]. Information can be converted to heat and
can perform work. Information is not just an abstract
notion [14]. It requires a physical carrier, and the latter
is (approximately) localized . After all, it was the business
of the Bell Telephone Company to transport information
from one telephone to another telephone, in a different
location.
In the EPR article, the authors complain that “it is
possible to assign two different wave functions to . . . the
second system,” and then, in the penultimate paragraph,
they use the word simultaneous no less than four times,
a surprising expression for people who knew very well
that this term was undefined in the theory of relativity.
Let us examine this issue with Bohm’s singlet model.
One observer, conventionally called Alice, measures the
z-component of the spin of her particle and find +h¯/2.
Then she immediately knows that if another distant ob-
server, Bob, measures (or has measured, or will measure)
the z-component of the spin of his particle, the result is
certainly −h¯/2. One can then ask: when does Bob’s par-
ticle acquire the state with sz = −h¯/2?
This question has two answers. The first answer is
that the question is meaningless — this is undoubtedly
true. The second answer is that, although the question
is meaningless, it has a definite answer: Bob’s particle
acquires this state instantaneously. This then raises a
new question: in which Lorentz frame is it instantaneous?
Here, there is also a definite answer: it is instantaneous in
the Lorentz frame that we arbitrarily choose to perform
our calculations [15]. Lorentz frames are not material
objects: they exist only in our imagination.
When Alice measures her spin, the information she
gets is localized at her position, and will remain so until
she decides to broadcast it. Absolutely nothing happens
at Bob’s location. From Bob’s point of view, all spin
directions are equally probable, as can be verified experi-
mentally by repeating the experiment many times with a
large number of singlets without taking in consideration
Alice’s results. Thus, after each one of her measurements,
Alice assigns a definite pure state to Bob’s particle, while
from Bob’s point of view the state is completely random
(ρ is proportional to the unit matrix). It is only if and
when Alice informs Bob of the result she got (by mail,
telephone, radio, or by means of any other material car-
rier, which is naturally restricted to the speed of light)
that Bob realizes that his particle has a definite pure
state. Until then, the two observers can legitimately as-
cribe different quantum states to the same system. For
Bob, the state of his particle suddenly changes, not be-
cause anything happens to that particle, but because Bob
receives information about a distant event. Quantum
states are not physical objects: they exist only in our
imagination.
In summary, the question raised by EPR “Can
quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be
considered complete?” has a positive answer. However,
reality may be different for different observers.
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